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Sequential Investment in
Site-Specific  Crop Management
Under Output Price Uncertainty
Murat Isik, Madhu Khanna, and Alex Winter-Nelson
An option-value model is developed to analyze the impacts of output price uncertainty,
high sunk costs of adoption, and site-specific  conditions  on the optimal timing of
adoption of two interrelated  site-specific technologies,  soil testing and variable rate
technology  (VRT).  The model  incorporates  the potential  for  adopting  these  two
technologies jointly or sequentially. The implications of the pattern of adoption  for
nitrogen pollution and for the design of a cost-share subsidy policy to accelerate the
adoption of these technologies to reduce nitrogen pollution are also analyzed. Ignor-
ing the potential for sequential adoption would tend to underpredict the adoption  of
soil testing and overpredict  the adoption of VRT.  Cost-share  subsidies to induce
accelerated  adoption of VRT would be most effective at reducing nitrogen pollution
if targeted toward fields with relatively high spatial variability in soil quality or soil
fertility, and either low average soil quality or low average soil fertility.
Key words: agricultural technologies,  cost-share subsidy, nitrogen pollution, option
value, price uncertainty,  spatial variability
Introduction
Conventional farm management practices apply nitrogen and other fertilizers uniformly
across fields. Because the fertility and quality of soils tend to vary within a field, these
practices can lead to overapplication of chemicals and high levels of nitrate runoff in at
least some parts of the field. Recent technological advances in site-specific crop manage-
ment (SSCM) make it possible  for farmers to acquire detailed information about the
spatial characteristics of their fields and target fertilizer applications to meet spatially
varying needs.  Variable  fertilizer applications  have the potential to improve  yields,
reduce fertilizer costs, and reduce nitrogen residuals in the soil. However, the decision
to adopt SSCM is  complicated by at least two factors. First, there is the potential to
profitably adopt different components of the technology either sequentially or jointly as
a package. Second, some components require a large sunk cost, which must be made in
the face of revenue  uncertainty.  This study presents a method to analyze adoption of
interrelated components of a technology under output price uncertainty and applies that
method to analyze mechanisms to encourage adoption of SSCM to achieve environmental
objectives.
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SSCM relies on several interrelated  technologies that can be adopted sequentially.
These include diagnostic tools such as grid-based soil testing to gather information about
soil conditions in the field and the variable rate technology  (VRT) used for applying
fertilizer at a varying rate on-the-go within the field to meet location-specific needs. Soil
testing provides  information  about the nutrient needs of the soil and can be used to
improve the choice  of uniform  rate of fertilizer  application  (Babcock  and Blackmer).
Likewise, soil testing results can reveal how the rate of fertilizer application in the field
should be spatially varied. Farmers, therefore, have a choice of either undertaking soil
testing and delaying or not adopting VRT, or adopting SSCM as a package by adopting
VRT immediately after soil testing.
Recent surveys of farmers show that the current rates of adoption of SSCM as a
package are low and that farmers appear to be adopting the technology piecemeal or
stepwise (Khanna, Epouhe, and Hornbaker).  For example, 37% of farmers surveyed in
the Midwest had adopted  soil testing, but only 12% had adopted VRT.  Uncertainties
about the returns from SSCM and its high costs of adoption ranked as two important
reasons for nonadoption by a majority of the farmers.
Uncertainties about the returns from adoption of SSCM could arise for several reasons,
such as uncertainty about output prices, yields, and weather, and about the ability of the
technology to accurately measure soil variability. While returns from SSCM are uncer-
tain, investment in some components involves high sunk costs. Because SSCM is still in
its infancy and undergoing rapid improvement, the resulting technological obsolescence
of existing equipment makes it unlikely for farmers to recover their sunk costs if the
investment  were to  be liquidated  due to declining revenues.  In this investigation,  we
focus on the implications of output price uncertainty for irreversible investment in SSCM.
Many studies have analyzed  the economic  and environmental  impacts of adoption
of soil testing (Schnitkey,  Hopkins, and Tweeten;  Babcock, Carriquiry,  and Stern)  or
SSCM as a technology package (Thrikawala et al.; Schnitkey,  Hopkins, and Tweeten;
Watkins, Lu, and Huang; Babcock and Pautsch). These studies treat adoption as a one-
time decision and rely on the net present value (NPV) method in their analysis, assuming
implicitly that future returns and costs are certain or that the investment is reversible.
In the case of SSCM, sequential adoption is attractive because the gains from adoption
of VRT depend  on the extent of spatial variability in soil conditions, which can only be
determined  after farmers undertake soil testing.
A few studies (e.g., Feder; Leathers and Smale) apply a Bayesian/learning approach
to show that differences in fixed costs, risk aversion,  or the need for learning about  a
technology  can lead farmers  to adopt certain components  of a technological  package
before others. The Bayesian approach  is useful for analyzing decision making in situ-
ations where the uncertainty can be characterized by a probability distribution which
is updated and made more precise by using information  acquired because of adopting
a new technology. However,  when uncertainties  are characterized  by a stochastic pro-
cess, irreversible investment decisions are involved, and farmers have flexibility in the
timing of adoption,  an option-value framework  is more appropriate.  The option-value
method allows analysis not only of the question of whether to adopt but also of when to
adopt.
A growing body of work has applied the option-value approach to explain the timing
of adoption  of agricultural technologies  (Purvis et al.; Winter-Nelson  and Amegbeto;
Price and Wetzstein; Khanna, Isik, and Winter-Nelson). These papers, however, analyze
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the adoption  of an indivisible  technology.  Bar-Ilan  and Strange analyze the optimal
timing of sequential investment in a two-stage project, but their model does not allow
for simultaneous  adoption  of all components  or for returns from the adoption of indi-
vidual components-both  of which are possible with SSCM.
Our study has three objectives. First, we adapt the option-value approach (Dixit and
Pindyck) to address situations in which there is output price uncertainty, high sunk
costs, and the possibility to adopt separate components of a technology piecemeal,
sequentially, or simultaneously.1 Second, we use an example of SSCM technologies to
illustrate  how analysis based  on the NPV rule and  analysis  that ignores  piecemeal
adoption within the option-value approach can misrepresent the returns to technology
adoption. Third, we demonstrate the potential policy relevance of considering piecemeal
adoption by examining the design of cost-share subsidies to achieve pollution reduction
by accelerating adoption of SSCM. The optimal targeting of  these subsidies across heter-
ogeneous soil conditions is analyzed, as well as how these subsidies should differ in their
incentives for adoption of soil testing and VRT.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.  The next section develops the
theoretical framework  to analyze  sequential investment  decisions.  Data used in the
numerical simulation are then described, followed by a discussion of the results of the
simulation. Our conclusions  are provided in the final section.
Theoretical Model
We consider a profit-maximizing farmer operating a field ofA acres. Soil fertility levels
vary within the field and the distribution of soil fertility is represented by a probability
density function, g(z), with mean p and variance a2. The level of soil fertility ranges from
a lower bound (1)  to an upper bound (u). We assume a deterministic, constant returns-to-
scale crop response function and represent the yield per acre (y) at any time (t) as
a function of the soil fertility level per acre z and the applied input per acre x. This
function is represented by yt = f(zt,  xt), with fz  > 0, fx  > 0, f,  < 0, and f,  < O.2
The farmer has a discrete choice among three alternatives: (a) using the conventional
practices, (b) adopting soil testing only, or (c) adopting both soil testing and VRT.3 These
choices are denoted by superscripts  C, S, and B, respectively. The farmer is assumed to
be  a price-taker  in the input and output markets.  Output price P, is assumed to be
changing over time, and the farmer has expectations of these prices in the future. Input
price w is assumed to be constant. The total cost of adoption of both soil testing and VRT
is represented by K/B  =  KtV  +  KS,  where the superscript V denotes VRT. These costs are
assumed to decline over time at the rates 6S  and 6", respectively,  implying that Kts=
KJ Se  t and KV  =  Kove -8V t. The lifetime of the VRT equipment is T years, and the discount
rate is p.
1The analysis could be extended to include other sources of uncertainty such as yield, weather, or technology.  To keep the
analysis tractable, while  illustrating the effect of uncertainty  on the incentives for sequential  adoption,  we focus only on
output price uncertainty.
2 Because we are assuming that time is a continuous variable, the time-dependent variables  should be denoted as x(t).
However,  for ease  of exposition, we are denoting them as x,.
3 The framework can be expanded to include a continuum of alternatives, such as adopting soil testing and varying inputs
within the field at a less fine scale than is possible with VRT. Little additional insight is expected,  however, on the motiva-
tions for sequential versus one-step adoption, while the costs in terms of analytical complexity would be substantial.
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In order to examine the environmental implications of SSCM, we assume a portion
of the applied input is absorbed by the crop and converted into dry grain matter,  OYt
(following Barry, Goorahoo, and Goss; Thrikawala et al.). The remainder of the applied
input may be carried over in the soil and change the level of soil fertility by z per acre
and/or generate polluting runoff (Rt) per acre:
(1)  R t =Xt  - y t - .
Decision Problem Under Certainty
The profit-maximizing adoption decision under certainty requires that the farmer adopt
a technology if the difference in the present value of the quasi-rents (revenue minus var-
iable costs) with and without adoption is greater than the additional costs of adoption.
This decision involves forecasting the profit-maximizing stream of expected returns with
the conventional practices, with soil testing alone, and with both soil testing and VRT,
and then comparing these forecasts to one another and the fixed costs of adoption.
Under conventional practices, the farmer lacks information about the distribution of
soil fertility in the field, but uses a small sample of soil tests to estimate the average soil
fertility (jp)  in the field. This approach to determining the input application rate is also
referred to as the averaging approach (Schnitkey, Hopkins, and Tweeten; Babcock and
Pautsch).  The farmer then assumes p  is the soil fertility level in the entire field  and
chooses a single level of input application per acre for the whole field by maximizing the
discounted value of expected quasi-rents,  nc, as follows:
(2)  Ir  = max f  e-PtA(E(Pt)f(xt,  t)  - wx)  dt,
where E denotes the expectations operator based on the subjective probability distribution
of future prices given the information  available at time t = 0.  The profit-maximizing
input rate is determined such that dcCl/xt =  E(Pt)fx(xt,  t)  - w = 0, and is represented by
t  =  x(E(Pt), w,  t).
Soil testing provides  information  about the distribution of soil fertility within  the
field, g(z). This makes it possible for the farmer to improve upon the conventional uniform
application rate which was based on information  about only one of the parameters, p,
of the distribution g(z). Knowledge ofg(z) leads to a new uniform rate for the whole field
to maximize the expected value of discounted quasi-rents,  no S , as follows:
(3)  = max  eT  A(E(Pt)f(xt, zt) - wxtg(z)dz]dt
io  = maXfox,  z)  -0gIddt
The profit-maximizing uniform input application per acre, giveng(z), is determined such
that  oS/laOxt = fl (E(Pt)f x(xt , zt))g(z)dz  - w = 0, and is represented by xt  = x(E(Pt), w,g(z)).
This input rate could be higher or lower than the input rate under the conventional
technology depending on the distribution of soil fertility.
The adoption of both soil testing and VRT makes it possible for the farmer to apply
the input at a spatially varying rate across the field. The input application rate xt is now
chosen given the site-specific level of soil fertility z, at each point in the field to maxi-
mize the discounted quasi-rents as follows:
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(4)  0= max f  e  [PtfuA(E(P)f(xt, z)  - wxt)g(z)dz]dt.
The input level at any point in the field is determined such that  rc/Ilaxt =  E(Pt)fx(x,  zt) -
w  = 0 for each z, and depends on the soil fertility level at that point; thus, xt  = x(E(Pt),
w, Zt). This rate would vary continuously across the field as zt varies.
The input levels for each technology are obtained from the first-order conditions of(2),
(3), and (4) to find the maximum values of the discounted quasi-rents  TC,  STU,  and  n  *.
The present value of the quasi-rent differential from adopting soil testing only is denoted
by NS(P, w, g(z),T,A)  =  no-  CT, while the corresponding present value from adopting
both components is denoted by No(P, w, g(z), T,  A) = no  - TC  . By disaggregating the quasi-
rent differential due to adoption of both soil testing and VRT, we obtain the quasi-rent
differential due to adoption of VRT: No  = No - N s .
The quasi-rent differentials  (No, No,  and N s ) are always positive as long as there is
any variability in soil conditions within the field, because input choice with either soil
testing or VRT is based on more information  and fewer constraints on the application
rate as compared to the conventional practice. This is because soil testing provides
information about the distribution of soil fertility within the field and enables the
farmer to choose a uniform input application rate xts to maximize his/her quasi-rents.
Because the  option of choosing xC is always  available  to the farmer,  even after  soil
testing, quasi-rents with soil testing must be at least as high as those under the conven-
tional practice.
Hennessy and Babcock show that the quasi-rent differential N s is always positive as
long as there is variability in soil fertility within the field. By adopting VRT and choosing
a different rate for each of the different plots in the field,  quasi-rents can  be further
increased relative to conventional practices because the farmer is no longer constrained
to apply a uniform rate across the field (as reported by Khanna, Isik, and Winter-Nelson;
Babcock and Pautsch). The above studies show that the quasi-rent differentials  (No,
No,  and NO 1 ) increase when the variability in the soil fertility distribution increases.
However, these differentials may not always be larger than the fixed costs of adopting
S, V, or B, respectively. Under the NPV rule, it would appear optimal to adopt both soil
testing and VRT at t = 0 if No > KB  and NoV> KV. Adoption of only soil testing would be
optimal if No > K s and NoV< Ko V.
Sequential  Investment Under Uncertainty
Suppose that the quasi-rent differentials  (NT, NT,  and NT ) are uncertain due to uncer-
tainty about output prices. To keep our analysis tractable, we assume these quasi-rent
differentials evolve as a geometric Brownian motion:
(5)  dNj = aJNjdt + ojNjdzi,  j  = S, V, B,
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance,  a is
the drift parameter,  and a is the volatility in the drift parameter. Equation (5) implies
that changes in the positive quasi-rent differentials Nj are lognormally distributed; that
is,  changes  in the logarithm of the difference in quasi-rents  relative to conventional
practices are normally distributed.
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The decision problem is to determine the optimal time T at which to adopt soil test-
ing and the optimal time Tat which to adopt VRT, where T Ž T due to the sequential
nature of the two decisions.  The decision problem is transformed  into a two-stage
sequential investment in which the first stage involves the decision to adopt soil testing
and the second stage involves the decision to adopt VRT. We use backward induction to
first solve the second-stage investment problem and then use it to solve the first-stage
problem. In the second stage, we determine T by maximizing the discounted net returns
of VRT.  Net returns are defined as the difference between the quasi-rent differential
and the fixed costs of adoption of VRT, and are represented  by:
(6)  FV(NT)  = E[(NT-  K)e]
The optimized value ofFV(NT V ) in (6), denoted by Fv(NT), may be thought of as the value
of the option to invest in VRT.  This option value is only available  to those who have
invested in soil testing. Assuming risk neutrality, (6) is maximized subject to (5), with
j  = V. Use of dynamic programming reveals it is optimal to invest in VRT at T when the
critical value of the quasi-rent differential is (Dixit and Pindyck):
(7)  N  =  Kt T
v pV- 1 TK
where
1v  i1  2p PV  - -1  +  >  1
(oV)2  (o()
2 2  (V)2
Thus the investment rule under uncertainty and irreversibility requires  NTVto be
greater than KT by a factor  of pV/(P  V-  1). We  refer to this factor  as the option-value
multiple for VRT. This multiple is a positive function of the growth rate (aV) and the
volatility of the growth rate in NT V,  o,  and a negative function of the discount rate. It
varies with the characteristics of the soil distribution. Because KY =  KVe - V y , an increase
in 86 results in a lower critical value of the quasi-rent differential  in the future and
makes adoption more likely in the future even if it is not optimal immediately.
Given FV(N  ), the optimal time to invest in soil testing is found by maximizing the
net returns from soil testing subject to (5), withj = S, as follows:
(8)  F(N)  = E[(N-  KS)e-T]+  FV(NV)
The solution to the maximization problem in (8) shows the optimal time T to invest in
soil testing is when the critical value of the quasi-rent differential due to soil testing is
T  pS  _  1 (T  T (9)  NS  K(  -F  v NY,
The critical value of the quasi-rent differential  required for investment in soil testing
increases with an increase in pS/(Ps - 1), an increase in the fixed costs of soil testing, and
a decrease  in the value of the option to invest in VRT. The optimal values T and T
represent  the expected  time of adoption  of soil testing and VRT,  respectively,  given
stochastic returns.
The anticipation  of high returns from subsequent adoption of VRT could create
incentives for investment in soil testing even when the quasi-rent differential due to soil
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testing is less than its fixed costs. Anticipated high returns lower the critical value of
quasi-rents required to induce adoption of soil testing. If the solution to the above two-
stage problem  shows that T > T, then the optimal decision  is to adopt  soil testing at
time  and to delay the adoption of VRT until T. When the optimal time to invest in soil
testing and VRT is T =  T, it is optimal to adopt both components at the same time. A
decision rule ignoring the possibility of adopting the components  stepwise imposes the
constraint that T =  T. This constrains the adoption of VRT to occur immediately after
the adoption of soil testing, and te  optimal time T to invest in both soil testing and
VRT would be obtained by maximizing the net returns from both soil testing and VRT
subject to (5), withj = B:
(10)  FB(NT)  = E[(NT - KT)e].
The solution to (10)  shows that the critical value of the quasi-rent differential at which
it is optimal to invest in the SSCM package  is
(11)  NB*= -I  KB
pB  - 1
A cost-share subsidy may be used to induce adoption when it is not otherwise optimal
to invest immediately. Under the NPV rule, the required cost-share subsidy for immedi-
ate investment is the difference between the present value of the quasi-rent differential
and the cost of investment when the former is greater than the latter. Under the option-
value approach, when the possibility of stepwise  adoption is recognized,  the subsidy
required for immediate investment differs for soil testing and VRT. The required cost-
share subsidy for soil testing if NS*> NS  is specified as:
(12)  H  =  S  P-  NS  - (N
The required subsidy for VRT if Nv*  > Nov is denoted by:
(13)  v  v  PV-1v.
If SSCM is treated as a package, and No*> NB,  the subsidy required to induce immedi-
ate investment in both components  is calculated  as:
(14)  HB =K o +  Ks - (No  + No)
pB
The required subsidy under the option-value approach is always higher than that
under the NPV rule because of the need to compensate for option values for given soil
conditions. The total subsidy for immediate investment in both soil testing and VRT as
a package (HB) could be lower or higher than the total subsidy under the sequential
investment rule (HS +  HV) depending on the values of the option-value multiples for soil
testing and VRT and FV(NTv). These subsidy estimates vary with the distribution of soil
characteristics influencing the value of the option-value multiple. In the following sec-
tion, we analyze the potential for sequential adoption and irreversibility to affect policy
results using a simulation model of corn production in Illinois.
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Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis considers variable application of three fertilizer inputs-nitrogen
(xn),  potassium (xp),  and phosphorus (xk)-applied to corn production under Illinois
conditions on a 500-acre farm field. These 500 acres are divided into 200 plots with an
area of 2.5 acres each.  Each 2.5-acre plot is tested and assumed to have homogeneous
soil conditions.  Soil tests provide information  about the levels and variability in two
attributes of the soil-soil fertility and soil quality.4 Soil fertility is defined in terms of
the levels of phosphorus and potassium in the soil. Soil quality depends on character-
istics such as organic matter and the sand and clay content of soil. These characteristics
determine the productivity of the soil and its maximum potential yield per acre under
given  climatic conditions.  This  study does not consider  the possibility  of measuring
nitrogen levels in the soil since soil nitrate tests have not been found to be successful in
accurately measuring and predicting the available nitrogen in the soil under Illinois
conditions [Illinois Cooperative Extension Service (CES)]. Nitrogen requirements of the
crop depend on the quality of the soil as represented by its maximum potential yield.
Consequently, nitrogen application rates under SSCM vary with variations in the maxi-
mum potential yield across a field; in the other systems, however, nitrogen application
is uniform across the field based on average soil quality in the field.
The distributions of soil nutrient levels of phosphorus and potassium and the distri-
bution of soil quality are characterized by appropriately scaled Beta distributions (as in
Dai, Fletcher,  and Lee).  The  distributions  of soil nutrient levels and soil quality are
determined by a random draw of numbers. Alternative soil conditions are simulated by
changing the means and variances  of the Beta distributions, using the same random
number seed. Two alternative mean levels (low and high) of soil fertility are considered
with three alternative  coefficients  of variation (CVF).  Similarly,  two  alternative  soil
quality distributions are considered with low and high levels of average potential yield.
Each of these distributions is characterized by two alternative coefficients of variation
of the soil quality distribution (CVQ).
A modified Mitscherlich-Baule  yield response function  is used to represent the
functional relationship between  crop yields and fertilizers (consistent with Schnitkey,
Hopkins, and Tweeten; Dai, Fletcher,  and Lee). We estimated the production function
parameters using data from the Illinois Agronomy Handbook (Illinois CES) for given
levels of the maximum yield potential. This function assumes maximum yield is attain-
able when all soil nutrients are available in appropriate amounts in the soil, and a
shortfall  in even one  input can  act  as a limiting factor to the attainment of the
maximum yield potential. Information on percentage of potential yield obtained during
field experiments  with various levels of each of the three fertilizer  inputs (nitrogen,
potassium, and phosphorous), while keeping the other two fertilizers at unconstrained
amounts, was used to calculate coefficients for the production function that best fit the
observed data. We obtained the following functional relationship:
(15)  yi  = hi(l - e-(.51+0. 025xin))( 1 - e -(028+ 0-1(XP+Zi)))(1  - e-(O.115+o.012(xik+zik)))
4 Adoption of SSCM may not completely eliminate uncertainty about soil nutrient levels due to measurement errors in soil
sampling and testing. It is likely that the inclusion of this uncertainty in our analysis would reduce the quasi-rent differential
and the extent of nitrogen pollution reduction  due to adoption.  The quasi-rent  differentials  and pollution reduction  rates
reported should therefore be considered as potential benefits.
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where hi represents the maximum potential yield, and zip and zk represent the amount
of phosphorus and potassium (respectively) present in the soil in plot i = 1,..., 200.
The soil fertility carryover equation (1) for phosphorus and potassium is calibrated
based on recommendations provided in the Illinois  Agronomy Handbook (Illinois CES).
Applied phosphorus and potassium in excess of amounts absorbed by plants are carried
over by the soil, raising soil fertility levels for the next crop.5 In the case of nitrogen, we
assume that 0.75 pounds of applied nitrogen are absorbed by a bushel of corn, and that
all excess nitrogen in the soil is available for leaching (Barry, Goorahoo,  and Goss).
SSCM is defined here to include soil testing and sampling that is done once in four
years, as well as the adoption of VRT and yield monitors. Information from soil testing
is used to determine  spatially varying input applications with VRT.  We  assume the
farmer tracks changes in the spatial variability in soil conditions by using a yield monitor
to guide the spatially varying input applications with VRT. The cost of grid soil sampling
and testing at the 2.5-acre level is $6.4 per acre ($1.6/acre/year), while the cost of the
yield monitor with a GPS receiver and the VRT equipment is $7,855 and $12,345, respec-
tively. 6The costs of maintenance and repair are assumed to be 1%  of the equipment cost.
Finally, farmers adopting SSCM need to undergo training in the use of equipment, which
is a one-time sunk cost at the time of adoption  of $1,125.
The total cost of the VRT components is $22,243. Assuming a five-year lifetime and
a 5% discount rate, this amounts to an average annual per acre cost of about $8.9. The
total cost of adopting both soil testing and VRT is $25,425 ($10.2/acre/year). The cost of
SSCM is expected to decline as growing demand leads to economies of scale in manufac-
turing. Indeed, a declining trend in the equipment costs is already being observed. The
costs ofAg Leader yield monitors and GPS receivers fell by about 10% between 1997 and
1999.  Hence, total  equipment  costs are  assumed  to decline in real terms by 5%  per
annum, while costs of custom hire services and soil testing are assumed to decline by 3%
per annum. Prices of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium are assumed to be at their
1997 levels of $0.20/pound,  $0.24/pound,  and $0.13/pound,  respectively.
The stochastic nature of the quasi-rent differentials in (5) is assumed to arise from
uncertainty in the  outputu  prices.  Because the corn-price  process is shown to be non-
stationary (see Khanna, Isik, and Winter-Nelson),  we model the output price process as
a geometric Brownian motion represented by the following discrete approximation (Dixit
and Pindyck, p. 72):
(16)  Pt = (1  + y)Ptl + 'Ptotv  ,
where y is the drift parameter, X is the standard deviation in the drift parameter,  and
Vt  is a normally  distributed random variable with mean zero and unit variance.  The
parameters  of the geometric  Brownian  motion are obtained  as in Forsyth. The  drift
parameter is estimated as y = m + (0.5),X2, where m is the mean of the series ln(Pt+ 1/Pt)
and X is the standard deviation  of the series. Using historical data on real corn prices
over the period 1926-1998  (U.S. Department of Agriculture), the value of y is found to
be -0.014.  The standard deviation of the average annual percentage  change  X is esti-
mated to be 0.223.
6 Phosphorus and potassium are not mobile nutrients and usually remain in the soil and contribute to environmental  con-
tamination only through soil erosion (Illinois CES; Schnitkey, Hopkins, and Tweeten).
6Costs of soil sampling and testing were provided by Illini FS, Inc., Agricultural Cooperative;  costs of yield monitors with
GPS and VRT were provided by Ag Leader Technology, Inc., and Ag-Chem Equipment Co., Inc., respectively.
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This process [equation (16)] is used to forecast prices for a 25-year period by assigning
random values to vt. Geometric Brownian motion of output prices justifies the assump-
tion of the stochastic process followed by the quasi-rent differentials  NT. The randomly
realized path of prices for the 25-year period is used to forecast the discounted quasi-
rent differentials if adoption were to occur in each of the T = 1, ..., 25 years for each soil
distribution. For each of these series of NT estimated for 25 years for each of the assumed
soil fertility and soil quality distributions, we then estimate ac  and ao  to characterize the
stochastic process in (5) and to determine the option value using (7) and (9).
Results
Implications of Adoption of Site-Specific
Technologies for Quasi-Rent
The impacts of alternative soil fertility and soil quality distributions on the average
per acre discounted quasi-rents over the five-year lifetime of the equipment with the
conventional practices, soil testing, and both soil testing and VRT are summarized in
table 1. Quasi-rents with all three adoption decisions increase as average soil fertility
within the field increases because there is a reduced need for fertilizer. Quasi-rents also
increase with an increase init  the average level of soil quality because themarginal pro-
ductivity of inputs is increased.
The adoption of both soil testing and VRT leads to an increase in quasi-rents, relative
to those with the conventional practices,  for all soil fertility and soil quality distri-
butions,  as expected  from the theoretical  analysis above  (table  1).  As average soil
quality increases, the uniform application rate rises for all inputs under the conven-
tional practices. This increases costs more than it increases yields per acre, and thus
the gains in quasi-rent with adoption of one or both components of SSCM increase.
An increase in the average level of soil fertility, on the other hand, reduces the quasi-
rent differential  of both soil testing and VRT because the yield gains and fertilizer
cost  savings with adoption  decrease  due to  diminishing marginal  productivity  of
inputs as soil fertility increases.  An increase in the variation of soil quality and/or
soil  fertility increases the quasi-rent  differential with both  soil testing and VRT
because it  increases the proportion  of the field constrained,  under the conventional
practices, to receiving less fertilizer in some parts of the field and more fertilizer in
other parts of the field.
Hence,  the levels  of soil fertility  and  soil quality in the field work  in opposite
directions in their effect on the quasi-rent differentials with adoption of soil testing or
both components. Increased variability in either, however, has a positive effect on these
quasi-rent  differentials.  Higher average  soil quality, lower average  soil fertility,  and
higher variability in soil quality and fertility lead to higher quasi-rent differentials. Our
results  are  consistent  with  the findings  of other  simulation  studies examining  the
impacts of adoption  of soil testing and VRT on alternative  soil fertility distributions
(Thrikawala et al.) and alternative  soil quality distributions (Babcock and Pautsch).
While these studies focus on a single soil attribute, this analysis shows the importance
of considering a combination of soil attributes when assessing the quasi-rent differential
because some of these soil attributes interact in opposing ways.
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Table 1.  Quasi-Rents Under Alternative Soil Fertility and Soil Quality Distri-
butions
Discounted Average Annual  Quasi-Rent Differential
Quasi-Rent  over Conventional
Soil Fertility  ($/acre)  ($/acre)
Soil  Soil  NPV Rule
CVF  Conven-  Soil  Testing  Soil  Testing  Adoption
Level  (%)  tional  Testing  +  VRT  Testing  +  VRT  Decision
--- -------  -- - LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ b-----------------
LOW  30  216.6  222.0  231.1  5.4  14.5  As
45  209.8  217.5  230.2  7.7  20.4  A
60  204.4  214.1  228.8  9.7  24.4  A
HIGH  30  248.8  252.1  259.9  3.3  11.1  A
45  238.2  242.5  255.2  4.2  16.9  A
60  225.8  232.1  249.0  6.3  23.2  A
-----------------  Low SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ  -----------------
LOW  30  211.5  219.6  233.9  8.1  22.4  A
45  205.3  215.5  233.1  10.3  27.8  A
60  200.4  212.5  231.7  12.1  31.3  A
HIGH  30  245.6  249.6  260.6  4.0  15.0  A
45  235.3  240.4  256.3  5.1  21.0  A
60  223.8  230.5  250.9  6.7  27.1  A
----------------  HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ --------------
LOW  30  285.1  296.8  306.7  11.7  21.6  A
45  276.2  294.2  306.7  18.2  30.5  A
60  268.7  292.4  306.2  23.6  37.5  A
HIGH  30  316.9  324.2  335.8  7.3  18.7  A
45  303.9  313.7  332.2  9.8  28.3  A
60  289.7  302.1  327.0  12.4  37.3  A
- --- --------  HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ -------  ----------
LOW  30  280.7  295.3  309.7  14.6  29.0  A
45  272.2  293.0  309.6  20.8  37.4  A
60  265.2  290.9  309.4  25.7  44.2  A
HIGH  30  313.2  332.4  336.2  9.2  23.0  A
45  300.8  311.7  333.6  10.9  32.8  A
60  287.4  300.4  329.6  13.0  42.2  A
Notes:  Under low soil fertility, the average levels of phosphorus and potassium are 30 pounds/acre and 200 pounds/acre,
respectively; under high soil fertility, the average levels of phosphorus and potassium are 50 pounds/acre and 280 pounds/
acre, respectively. Low soil quality indicates an average potential yield of 130 bushels/acre; high soil quality indicates an
average potential yield of 165 bushels/acre.
"CVF refers to coefficient of variation in the distribution  of phosphorus and potassium.
b CVQ refers to coefficient of variation in the distribution  of soil quality.
cA indicates that adoption of both soil testing and VRT is profitable under the NPV rule, while As indicates that adoption
of only soil testing is profitable.
Additionally, in this study we disaggregate the quasi-rent differential with adoption
of both soil testing and VRT into the proportions represented by each of the respective
components. The contribution of VRT to the quasi-rent differential is greater than that
of soil testing on all the soil distributions, with the exception of those with high average
quality and low average fertility (table 1). As expected, the incremental contribution of
VRT to the total quasi-rent differential increases  as the variability in soil conditions
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increases. The gains in discounted average annual quasi-rents with the adoption of soil
testing range between $3.3 per acre on the soils with high average quality and low aver-
age fertility, and $25.7 per acre on the soils with low average fertility and high average
quality. The average annual discounted cost of adopting soil testing is only $1.6 per acre.
Consequently, the NPV rule would predict the adoption  of soil testing is profitable
on all the soil conditions considered here. The average annual quasi-rent differen-
tials of adopting both soil testing and VRT range between  $11.1 per acre and $44.2
per acre on these  soils. Because the per acre annual discounted  cost of soil testing
and VRT is about  $10.2 per acre, the NPV rule suggests it is optimal to adopt both
soil testing and VRT.
The total discounted quasi-rent differentials of both soil testing and VRT over the five
years exceed the total fixed costs of adoption on most of the soil conditions considered
here. As shown in table  1, according to the NPV rule, adoption of both soil testing and
VRT is preferred to the conventional practices on  all the soil conditions except on the
soils with low average quality,  coefficient  of variation in the soil quality of 25%,  and
coefficient of variation in the soil fertility distribution  of 30%. On such soil conditions,
adoption of only soil testing is profitable.
Optimal Timing of Adoption
We now examine the impacts of output price uncertainty on the optimal timing of adop-
tion, and whether it is optimal to adopt SSCM as a package  or sequentially for each of
the soil distributions considered here. With uncertain prices, there might be a value to
waiting and observing prices in the future before incurring sunk costs to avoid a loss if
prices were to fall in the immediate future. The timing of investment depends  on the
realizations of random prices. High realizations of prices signal higher future expected
prices and a higher expected quasi-rent differential, which reduces the chance an invest-
ment will be lost and thus increases the expected returns from the investment.  Low
realized prices signal the need to wait longer.
The ex ante optimal timing of adoption of soil testing and VRT for a randomly obtained
price path is found by calculating the critical value of the quasi-rent differential required
for investment and comparing it to the expected quasi-rent differential in each of the 25
years for each soil fertility and soil quality distribution. The method for determining the
critical value of the quasi-rent differential required for investment in soil testing and
VRT is presented in (7) and (9).
The estimates of the option-value multiples for VRT and soil testing are reported in
table 2.  These  option-value multiples  determine  the degree to which the quasi-rent
differential must exceed the investment costs before investment will occur, given uncer-
tainty and sunk costs. The estimates of  the option-value multiples vary with the distribu-
tion of soil characteristics within the field, indicating the role of soil characteristics  in
mitigating the effects of uncertainty on the adoption decision. As the variability in soil
fertility and quality increases,  this factor increases for soil testing but decreases for
VRT. This dynamic occurs because increased variability in soil conditions increases the
benefits of VRT and reduces the relative gains from soil testing alone. The option-value
multiple for soil testing ranges from 1.4 on low average fertility and quality soils to 3.4
on high average fertility and quality soils. The option-value  multiple for VRT ranges
from  1.7 on high average fertility soil to 3.8 on low average fertility soil.
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Table 2.  Timing of Adoption of Soil Testing and VRT Under Alternative Soil
Fertility and Soil Quality Distributions
Soil Fertility  Packae  Sequential Adoption  Option-Value  Multiple Package:
Soil Testing  Soil  'Soil
CVF  +  VRT  Testing  VRT  Soil  Testing
Level  (%)  (year)  (year)  (year)  Testing  VRT  +  VRT
-----------------  LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ b-----------------
Low  30  11  1  c  1.424  3.109  2.132
45  2  1  11  1.802  2.716  2.236
60  2  1  7  2.268  2.573  2.317
HIGH  30  16  1  - 2.120  2.726  2.292
45  11  1  17  2.452  2.886  2.448
60  2  1  11  2.455  2.970  2.569
------ -- -------  LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ  -----------------
LOW  30  1  1  7  2.097  2.205  1.909
45  1  1  2  2.045  2.123  2.029
60  1  1  1  2.735  2.265  2.335
HIGH  30  11  1  16  2.716  2.314  2.202
45  7  1  7  2.588  2.514  2.277
60  1  1  2  2.675  2.543  2.357
-- ---- ---  - HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ -------  -- -----
LOW  30  2  1  -1.584  3.880  2.019
45  1  1  17  1.603  3.362  2.087
60  1  1  16  1.797  3.087  2.167
HIGH  30  2  1  7  3.422  1.778  1.893
45  1  1  1  2.620  1.887  2.001
60  1  1  1  3.170  1.878  2.094
-------------  - HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ -----------------
Low  30  1  1  11  1.542  2.664  1.854
45  1  1  7  1.661  2.380  1.937
60  1  1  1  1.735  2.265  1.939
HIGH  30  1  1  7  2.212  1.802  1.887
45  1  1  1  2.775  1.794  1.950
60  1  1  1  3.261  1.782  2.019
a CVF refers to coefficient of variation in the distribution of phosphorus and potassium.
b CVQ refers to coefficient of variation in the distribution of soil quality.
cIndicates adoption is not profitable in the next 25 years.
Table  2 reveals that immediate adoption (at year 1) of both soil testing and VRT is
only worthwhile on soil distributions with high average quality, low average fertility,
and relatively high variability in both. On most of the other soil distributions, it is
optimal to delay the adoption of VRT and adopt it sequentially. This is because high
option values to VRT create critical threshold values of net returns which are much
higher than the quasi-rent differentials. Unlike the NPV rule, the option-value rule
forecasts delay of up to 17 years before adopting VRT on most of the soil distributions.
These results on the timing of adoption are robust to changes in the discount rate from
5% to 10%. The option-value  approach  also forecasts  delaying adoption  of VRT for at
least 25 years on the soil distributions with low soil quality and low variability in soil
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quality. 7 The decision rule suggests more waiting on the high average fertility and the
low average quality soils with low variability in both. As the variability in these char-
acteristics increases, the waiting time decreases substantially.
When the decision rule is constrained to require adoption of VRT immediately after
the adoption of soil testing, the total discounted quasi-rent differential must be  1.3 to
2.5 times greater than the total costs of investment,  as indicated by the option-value
multiple  for the  package  (last column  in  table  2).  This  factor  also varies  with  the
distribution of soil characteristics, and in most cases lies in between the factor estimated
separately  for soil  testing and for VRT.  Thus,  considering SSCM  as a package may
underestimate the critical value of the quasi-rent differential at which it is optimal to
adopt VRT, while it may overestimate the crtical value of the quasi-rent differential of
soil testing. Imposing simultaneous adoption therefore tends to predict earlier adoption
of VRT than is predicted by the sequential analysis, particularly on soil distributions
with low average quality and fertility (as shown in column 2 of table 2).
The timings of adoption obtained here for each of the components  are meant to be
illustrative rather than definitive.  This analysis illustrates how uncertainty about the
quasi-rent differential from adoption creates incentives to delay adoption, particularly
of the component  (VRT) involving high sunk costs. The analysis also shows  s how these
incentives vary with soil distributions.
Implications of Soil Testing and VRT
for Nitrogen Pollution Control
The impacts of adoption of soil testing and VRT on nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus
application rates and crop yield are used to determine the impact on pollution (summar-
ized in table 3). Adoption of soil testing and VRT reduces nitrogen application per acre
while  increasing yield per acre, and therefore reducing nitrogen pollution relative to
levels under the conventional  practices on all soil distributions considered.  The extent
to which these changes occur varies across soil distributions. For example, on soil
distributions with low soil fertility, low soil quality, and CVF of 30% and CVQ of 25%,
pollution falls by 11.9% due to adoption of soil testing and VRT; soil testing accounts for
a 9% reduction, and VRT contributes an additional 2.9% reduction. In contrast, on fields
with high average fertility, low soil quality, and CVF of 60% and CVQ of 40%, the reduc-
tion in pollution due to soil testing and VRT is 32.4% (with soil testing alone leading to
a reduction of 21.2%).
As the variability  in soil fertility and soil quality increases,  the extent of nitrogen
pollution reduction due to adoption of one or both technologies increases.  Reductions of
nitrogen pollution with the adoption of only soil testing range from 9%  on the low
average fertility and quality soils to 34% on the high average fertility and quality soils.
Total pollution reductions with the adoption of both soil testing and VERT range between
12% and 55%. The adoption of only soil testing reduces nitrogen pollution more than the
additional pollution reduction obtained with adoption of  VRT, particularly on fields with
low variability.
7The optimal timing of adoption with custom hiring of VRT as opposed to owner purchase of VRT is also analyzed. Custom
hiring of VRT reduces but does not completely eliminate the sunk costs of adoption, because several components such as yield
monitors need to be owner-purchased, while others such as soil testing involve one-time sunk costs. Hence, it is still optimal
to adopt soil testing and VRT sequentially;  the waiting time to custom hiring VRT lies between 2 and  11 years.
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Table 3. Nitrogen Pollution and Cost-Share Subsidy Requirements for Immed-
iate Adoption Under Alternative Soil Fertility and Soil Quality Distributions
Pollution Pollution Reduction  Cost-Share Subsidy 
P ol lu tion
Pollution  over Conventional  Required  Reducion
in Pounds/$ Soil Fertility  (lbs./acre)  Practices  (%)  (%  of capital costs)  Subsidy for Subsidy for
Soil  SSCM as a  Sequential  VRT with
CVFa  Conven-  Soil  Testing  Package: Soil  Adoption  Sequential
Level  (%)  tional  Testing  +  VRT  Testing + VRT  VRT  Adoption
-----------------  LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 25%  CVQ b-----------------
LOW  30  43.6  9.0  11.9  38.1  69.1  0.87
45  45.7  12.5  16.3  16.6  50.5  1.69
60  47.4  15.2  19.4  4.1  39.5  2.68
HIGH  30  40.6  10.6  16.2  59.5  71.1  0.94
45  44.1  15.1  19.9  39.1  54.5  1.86
60  47.9  19.8  25.4  19.4  40.4  3.48
-----------------  LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ  -----------------
LOW  30  45.2  12.6  22.1  - 37.4  3.05
45  47.1  15.6  25.8  13.0  10.72
60  48.7  18.0  28.3
HIGH  30  41.8  13.2  22.6  40.8  51.8  2.09
45  44.9  17.1  27.6  18.4  34.5  4.11
60  48.5  21.2  32.4  15.9  11.38
--  --- - --  - --- HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ --  -------- ----
Low  30  30.1  18.4  23.6  2.1  72.6  1.14
45  32.8  25.6  31.3  59.9  1.98
60  35.1  30.5  36.3  20.3  7.21
HIGH  30  27.1  20.4  29.2  12.5  35.9  2.54
45  31.1  26.4  37.8
60  35.5  32.1  44.6
--  -- ------- ---  HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ-------------- -
Low  30  31.4  22.3  38.7  - 42.4  3.29
45  34.1  28.6  44.8  - 23.7  7.44
60  36.2  32.9  48.9
HIGH  30  28.3  23.4  42.3  -21.9  6.31
45  32.1  28.3  49.5
60  36.2  33.7  55.3  - -
CVF refers to coefficient of variation in the distribution of phosphorus and potassium.
bCVQ refers to coefficient of variation in the distribution of soil quality.
Indicates cost-share subsidy is not necessary.
To examine the implications of output price uncertainty for the design of cost-share
subsidies to achieve pollution reduction by accelerating adoption, we estimate cost-share
subsidies required for immediate adoption of soil testing and VRT as a percentage of the
capital costs of adoption (table 3). Ignoring uncertainty and irreversibility, the NPV rule
indicates there is no need to offer a cost-share subsidy for inducing adoption of soil test-
ing and VRT on most of the soil conditions considered here.
When the possibility of stepwise adoption  is recognized under the option-value ap-
proach, no cost-share subsidy is required to induce immediate adoption of soil testing,
but large subsidies are needed to induce adoption of VRT. The required subsidy for VRT
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varies depending on the soil conditions. No subsidy is needed to induce the adoption of
VRT  on fields with  relatively high  soil  quality, high soil fertility,  and  high spatial
variability in one or both. These are also the fields on which  adoption of VRT would
achieve high rates of reduction in nitrogen pollution.
Among the other soil conditions considered here, the pollution reduction per dollar
of subsidy to adopt VRT is higher on fields with low soil quality and/or low soil fertility
but high variability in soil quality and/or high variability in soil fertility (last column
of table 3). A subsidy would be most effective at reducing pollution if targeted to these
soil conditions.
Table 3 also reports the effects of ignoring the possibility of stepwise adoption on the
required cost-share subsidies for immediate adoption. The findings identify a need to
offer a cost-share subsidy to induce immediate adoption of both soil testing and VRT on
many of the soil conditions considered here. Compared to sequential decision making,
which offers different subsidy rates for soil testing and VRT, modeling SSCM as a pack-
age underestimates the required subsidy for adoption of  VRT while it overestimates the
required subsidy for soil testing.
Conclusions
A model was developed in this study to analyze the adoption of interrelated technologies
when fixed costs can generate  option values  to delaying investment and  some com-
ponents of the technological package can be profitably adopted sequentially. Application
of the model to site-specific crop management reveals the extent to which recognition
of option values and the possibility of piecemeal adoption can influence forecasts about
adoption. In our simulation, the model designed to account for uncertainty using the
option-value approach and sequential adoption provides a better explanation for the low
observed rates and sequential pattern of adoption of SSCM than models based on the
NPV rule. The model also yields more precise  policy implications concerning green
subsidies.
Based on our results, the NPV rule predicts farmers would adopt both soil testing and
VRT at the same time under most of  the soil conditions considered here. However, recog-
nition of the possibility of stepwise adoption under output price uncertainty indicates
that it is preferable to adopt soil testing but to delay investment in VRT or not to adopt
VRT at all unless the average soil quality is high and the variability in soil quality and
soil fertility is relatively high. Thus the NPV rule would overpredict the adoption of
VRT. Recognizing the option value of investment but ignoring the potential for stepwise
adoption would tend to underpredict the adoption of soil testing and overpredict the
adoption of VRT.
Our findings reveal higher reduction in nitrogen pollution with adoption of SSCM on
the high average quality and fertility soils with relatively high variability. The option-
value method, while considering the possibility of stepwise adoption, indicates that
although  a cost-share subsidy is not necessary to induce adoption of soil testing, a
subsidy is needed to induce adoption of VRT, particularly on soil conditions with low
average soil quality and/or fertility. Cost-share subsidies to accelerate  the adoption of
VRT would be most effective at reducing nitrogen pollution if targeted  toward fields
with low average soil quality and/or low average soil fertility and high spatial variability
in soil quality and/or soil fertility. Ignoring the possibility of stepwise adoption under
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the option-value approach leads to underestimation of the required subsidy for adoption
of VRT and overestimation of the required subsidy for soil testing.
We have focused only on the impacts of output price uncertainty on adoption of two
interrelated technologies. Stochastic output prices are not the only source of uncertainty
faced by farmers when making a decision about whether and when to invest in a new
technology. Other sources of uncertainty include measurement error in soil testing and
variable application, and uncertainty about revenue, costs, and weather. The inclusion
of measurement error is likely to reduce the returns from site-specific  technologies,  as
shown by Babcock, Carriquiry, and Stern in the case of soil testing. The results presented
here may therefore underestimate the incentives to delay adoption. More definitive
results could be achieved by extending this model to examine the full range of uncertain-
ties, a more complete set of technical options, and a broader range of  farm characteristics.
Conducting the empirical analysis for numerous other randomly realized paths of output
prices and finding the expected time of adoption could provide more accurate forecasts
of the likely timing of adoption on each of the soil distributions.
[Received March 2000; final revision received  January  2001.]
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